I am still reading comments and posts about the new "55% vote for a dissolution of Parliament" rule that the new coalition Government intends to introduce as part of its electoral reform programme.
I left this alone when I first read about it as I thought that everyone would have realised the truth by now, but no: there are those out there who are just too eager to find fault, and who will jump at any apparent chance to do so.
Fortunately, Liberal Democrat Voice has explained it so well that I can simply direct anyone who hasn't yet "got it" (or been misled by the BBC and others' coverage) over there. In brief: this is a new power to Parliament to cause a dissolution, which is something the House cannot do at present. A Vote Of No Confidence does not trigger a dissolution, which is still in the hands of the Prime Minister.
Indeed, the seemingly controversial 55% vote level could if anything be set too low, as there is scope at the 55% level for a PM to "engineer" an early dissolution (bearing in mind the other side of this reform coin: fixed term parliaments) and I think it might need to be revised upward when that is realised by the new Cabinet.
It's amazing how many commentators are ready to pounce on something (anything!) they can perceive as negative, without even having checked it properly first.
Have faith, already!
As far as I can gather it's not a confidence in the government sort of thing, but rather a means to call an end to parliament when it is under fixed terms, in that sense it does make sense. I doubt many governments could rule under a minority hostile house for too long anyway, the business of governance would just get clogged up until someone calls for a dissolution.
ReplyDeleteYes, that's about the size of it, more or less.
ReplyDeleteI am rather concerned about this, but not for the reasons many have voiced.
ReplyDeleteIf we remove the absolute priciple of 50% + 1, then there will be an excuse made for this to be a principle explanded. I would not like to see this used for legislative purposes.
Also, in the constitutional aspect, if a PM loses a confidence vote by 50%+1, this alone does not trigger his resignation or a trip to the Palace. The PM must still make the decision to dissolve parliament and he will, under this constitutional change, need to secure 55% of the house to allow him to do this. I'm not sure that this is what was intended.
Although this is designed to provide cover to the Liberals to stop their Conservative partners cutting them off and going or a majority at a convenient point, I fear that this will be open to abuse in future parliaments. Allowing minorities to govern against the will of the house and the people would be a terrible price to pay for what is designed purely as a confidence measure for the Liberals.
Better not to go there, rather than to take the risk of entrenched minority government. We must not forget the character of the last administration and the potential consequences of allowing them such a powerful lever were they re-elected.
I don't see this as establishing a precedent: it's a brand new power, and the parameters are being set appropriate to that power.
ReplyDeleteUnless I've got it wrong, I think you have mixed up the 55% for dissolution votes with the (complete separate) Vote of Confidence, which remains (as I understand it) as a "50% plus one" vote.
Even so, I suspect that setting it as low as 55% initially was precisely because people might get upset if it were higher, not understanding.
Thus, even though there is good reason to have a higher bar for this power (mainly to prevent a PM from get his/her own party to vote for a dissolution and thus bypassing the new fixed term parliament rule), until the public-at-large have grasped what it means and how it would work, it will need to stay at this lower-than-ideal percentage.
A better number would be 65% or perhaps two-thirds, for this specific power alone.
John Tony_E isnt confused.
ReplyDeleteHis point is that if the government has lost the confidence of the House of Commons with 50% + 1 it can still remain in office because a dissoltution would require 55%. Therefore the primacy of the HoC is undermined; it is also a slippery slope towards dictatorship if this were increased to 60, 65 or 75%. Stable government but at what price.
The point is that one administration is tinkering with the Constitution unncessarily. If there was a vote of no confidence in HM Government it would look terrible if the government were to remain in office - but that is the design. Quiet_man hits this point well. Why tinker if you couldnt work anyway?
The constitution isnt designed to be the play-thing of Prime Ministers to be gerrymandered for political behest. This is a bad idea, and intelligent people can see not only the inconsitencies but also the blatant intent behind this move.
Oh dear! There are still those who don't get it. This isn't taking any powers away from anyone, it's adding a brand new one but trying not to leave a loophole for the Prime Minister to circumvent the new "fixed term" situation.
ReplyDeleteDo I have to draw a truth table? If so, let me know and I shall do so, or something very similar to illustrate the reality of what is (as I understand it, based on what is currently in the public domain) being proposed.
It really wouldn't be a problem for me to do so, if it would aid understanding.
John, I may not have made my point clearly so I beg your indulgence of a second attempt.
ReplyDeleteIf anyone in the house, (not just the PM) can call a disolution vote, then it is a new power. No argument there, this has never been available to the legislature before. Oppositions could call confidence votes, and although they would by convention trigger elections if lost, there is no compulsion for this in law.
Secondly, if the government calls a confidence vote and loses, there is currently no law which forces a PM to call an election. When Chamberlain lost the house, he went to the King and suggested that he call Churchill.
So Cameron loses a confidence vote, he now has two choices - he can go to the Queen and resign as PM, offering her advice on who to call on to form a government. Or he can go to the house and try to force one by gaining 55% of the house in a dissolution vote.
However, convention since Wilson has seems to have been that if a government is unable to pass a manefesto bill, the PM would call it as an issue of confidence in the government and would put it to the house that if it had no confidence in him they could vote down the bill and trigger an election with 50%+1.
With the introduction of the 55% rule, Cameron takes away the current potency of such a vote because it can no longer trigger a GE in itself, (even if the PM would wish it to), there would have to be a subsequent vote for dissolution. The threshold for that has been raised.
So a vote of confidence would still be expected to trigger a change of leadership, possibly an end to the coalition and the formation of another, but would be less likely to trigger a GE.
This concerns me, the fact that if the government cannot pass its business, another government can possibly take over but we the voters may have no say. This was less likely before this 55% rule.
Of course, all this relies on my hazy memory of 'constitution 101' class of 99 (open university)! I could be totally mistaken..
Thanks for the clarification, Tony_E. I'm trying to get my head around all the possibilities and variables associated with the new policy, but it's not yet all that clear.
ReplyDeleteI now read that the issue is to be debated in Parliament anyway, for which there will be detailed documents come into the public domain, so I suspect it's probably best to sit tight and see what emerges.
Hopefully the picture will then become much clearer, along with all the implications and alternatives.